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NOT PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
__________
No. 19-2183
__________
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
v.
LOUIS HILL, a/k/a Lou,
Appellant
__________
On Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania
(E.D. Pa. No. 2:18-cr-00191-001)
Hon. Cynthia M. Rufe, United States District Judge
__________
Submitted Under Third Circuit L.A.R. 34.1(a)
on July 1, 2020
Before: KRAUSE and PHIPPS, Circuit Judges, and BEETLESTONE,* District Judge.
(Filed: July 2, 2020)
__________
OPINION†
__________

*

Honorable Wendy Beetlestone, United States District Court for the Eastern District
of Pennsylvania, sitting by designation.
†

This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does
not constitute binding precedent.

KRAUSE, Circuit Judge.
Louis Hill pleaded guilty to one count of unlicensed firearms dealing and multiple
counts of being a felon in possession of a firearm. He appeals his sentence, arguing the
District Court erred in applying the gun trafficking enhancement under U.S.S.G.
§ 2K2.1(b)(5). We discern no error and so will affirm.
DISCUSSION1
The Sentencing Guidelines call for a four-level increase in the offense level of any
defendant who “engaged in the trafficking of firearms.” U.S.S.G. § 2K2.1(b)(5). For the
enhancement to apply, the defendant must have “kn[own] or had reason to believe” that
his conduct “would result in the transport, transfer, or disposal of a firearm to an individual . . . whose possession or receipt of the firearm would be unlawful.” U.S.S.G. § 2K2.1
cmt. n.13(A)(ii). And an individual cannot “[]lawful[ly]” receive a firearm if “at the time
of the offense [he] was under a criminal justice sentence, including probation.” Id. cmt.
n.13(B).
Here, the District Court found Hill knew or had reason to know that the confidential
informant to whom he sold seven firearms was under a probationary sentence at the time.2
We review that factual finding under the “deferential” clear error standard. See United
States v. Richards, 674 F.3d 215, 218–23 (3d Cir. 2012). Because a review of the record
leaves us with no “definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been committed,” United
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As we write only for the parties, who are familiar with the background of this case,
we need not reiterate the factual or procedural history.
2

Although the District Court also found Hill knew or had reason to know that the
confidential informant “ha[d] a prior conviction for a crime of violence,” U.S.S.G. § 2K2.1
cmt. n.13(B), we need not address that alternative ground for the enhancement.
2

States v. Foster, 891 F.3d 93, 113 (3d Cir. 2018) (citation omitted), we have no basis to
second-guess the Court’s conclusion.
That conclusion finds substantial support in the record. There is no question the
informant to whom Hill sold firearms was on probation during the relevant period, and that
informant and Hill had many degrees of connection: They grew up and lived in the same
neighborhood for many years; had been friends “since at least 2009,” App. 29; attended
high school together; “commit[ed] crimes together” in their younger years, App. 31; engaged in frank discussions about criminal activities; and, during the relevant period, had
extensive electronic and face-to-face communications while planning and executing seven
firearm transactions. Most relevant, during a recorded telephone call between the second
and third transactions, the informant told Hill he could not talk because he was “at the PO
office,” Appellant’s Br. 15 n.3 (quoting the Presentence Report), using an abbreviation that
the parties agree refers to the probation office. Given the “substantial relationship” between Hill and the informant, App. 36, and the informant’s plain statement to Hill during
the call, the District Court found that Hill knew or had reason to know the informant was
on probation. In making that factual finding regarding Hill’s mental state, the Court appropriately relied on circumstantial evidence, see United States v. Douglas, 885 F.3d 145,
151 (3d Cir. 2018), and drew reasonable inferences based on that evidence.
Contrary to Hill’s argument, we do not fault the District Court on this record for
“fail[ing] . . . to rule out any possible innocent inferences,” Appellant’s Br. 8, before making its finding. True, where “the evidence [i]s ‘in equipoise,’ the government ha[s] failed
to meet its burden” with respect to the imposition of a sentencing enhancement. United
States v. Cicirello, 301 F.3d 135, 142 (3d Cir. 2002) (citation omitted). That principle
follows from the Government’s burden to prove the appropriateness of an enhancement
3

“by a preponderance of the evidence.” Id. But that burden was not met in Cicirello because
“there [we]re no facts from which Cicirello’s knowledge, intent or belief at the relevant
time c[ould] be gleaned.” Id. at 141; see id. at 138 (explaining that the record revealed
“nothing as to where, how, or to whom Cicirello sold the guns”). The same is true for the
other decisions Hill cites. See United States v. Moody, 915 F.3d 425, 428 (7th Cir. 2019)
(involving a defendant who sold guns to wholly “anonymous buyers”); United States v.
Askew, 193 F.3d 1181, 1182 (11th Cir. 1999) (involving a defendant who knew neither to
whom the guns were sold nor “any of the circumstances surrounding the sale”). Conversely, where the record contains “facts from which an inference of . . . knowledge or
reason to believe can be drawn,” a district court may draw that inference and apply a section 2K2.1(b)(5) enhancement regardless whether the defendant is able to identify a more
“innocent” reading of those facts. Cicirello, 301 F.3d at 142 & n.5 (collecting cases); see
Moody, 915 F.3d at 430 (“Moody’s case . . . stands in contrast to those in which the seller
knew something more about the buyers than that they were in the market for a gun.” (emphasis added)); Askew, 193 F.3d at 1184 (contrasting cases in which “the defendants had
personal contact with the transferees,” making it “logical for the sentencing court to infer
a certain level of knowledge about their buyers[]”). And in such cases, a district court is
not required to sua sponte identify “innocent possibilities” not raised by the defendant or
reasonably inferred from the facts in the record.
Here, the evidence was not “in equipoise,” Cicirello, 301 F.3d at 142 (citation omitted), and the District Court had ample factual material from which to conclude the enhancement was appropriate. Cicirello therefore does not supply the rule of decision. And while
Hill has identified other plausible inferences the District Court might have been drawn, we
are faced with “two permissible views of the evidence” and an incontestable conclusion
4

flowing therefrom: that the District Court’s “choice between them cannot be clearly erroneous,” Anderson v. City of Bessemer City, 470 U.S. 564, 574 (1985).
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, we will affirm the District Court’s judgment.
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